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In this paper we study complex interactions between gender and poverty in postwar 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The goal of our analysis is to uncover how a spectrum of 
gender differentials at different parts of the life cycle varies across income groups. Using 
the data from the 2001 BiH LSMS, we find strong gender-poverty interaction in the 
patterns of labor force participation, gender gap in earnings, individuals’ school finances 
and school attendance. The main source of gender inequality seems to come from 
differences in investments in girls’ and boys’ educations that increase with declines in 
income levels. Short-term income shocks could lead to long-term increases in gender 
inequality in households with school age children, unless there is ready access to credit 
markets. We also find that the magnitude of the impact of economic development on 
gender differences in Bosnia will depend on where the growth is concentrated. If the poor 
capture at least some benefits of economic growth, the gender differences in household 
investment in human capital of their children will decline. If, on the other hand, growth is 
concentrated among the richest, then important gender disparities could remain pervasive. 
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In nearly all societies, one would expect to see the differences between genders in school 
enrolment rates, wages, labor force participation, and other labor market, education, and 
health outcomes. These differences could be determined by discrimination, biological 
differences, and individual and societal beliefs about appropriate gender roles. 
Additionally, one would expect to see differences in many outcomes depending on 
household wealth. Wealthy families, for example, might invest more in the children’s 
schooling than poor families. The interactions between gender and poverty could be quite 
complex and empirically it is often difficult to disentangle the causal relations from 
proximate indicators.  
The goal of this analysis is to uncover how a spectrum of gender differentials 
varies across income groups. Is there evidence of gender discrimination that varies with 
wealth? Are there reasons to consider interventions to affect these gender differentials? 
Could the social welfare be improved by allocating resources to offset the discriminatory 
practices? The analysis presented here is trying to provide key information needed to 
address these questions. 
Gender equality existed de jure during the socialist era in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, though de facto there were differences in the opportunities and outcomes for 
men and women. With the fall of the socialist regime and the start of the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH), there was no longer a strong central authority and new 
institutions had not yet arisen. Social protection was weak, and real incomes fell 
significantly. Over 250,000 people died or were missing. Over 50% of the population had 
been internally displaced, and ethnic cleansing forced many into poverty (Bisogno and 
Chong, 2002). In this environment many existing gender imbalances were exacerbated.  
Understanding the interaction of gender and poverty can lead to better designed 
policies for both alleviating poverty and reducing gender discrimination. This context is 
especially important for BiH, given that its transition to a market economy was derailed 
by the five years of civil war. Policy makers in BiH need to understand the source of 
gender differentials in order to make informed policy decisions.    3
Equally important is the recognition that as BiH continues to recover from the 
war, increases in incomes and wealth will tend to mitigate some important gender 
differentials while at the same time exacerbating others. Our theoretical analysis indicates 
that gender differentials arising from differential investments in children by gender need 
not always increase or decrease with income. Nor do gender differentials always need to 
favor one gender over another. These theoretical ambiguities can only be resolved by a 
detailed empirical analysis like that presented in this paper. 
Using the data from 2001 Bosnia Living Standard Monitoring Survey (BLSMS), 
we focus on a set of key indicators of gender differences and how they are related to a 
household’s wealth. We develop a simple theoretical model of parents making investment 
decisions in their children’s human capital. This model provides empirically testable 
predictions about the possible sources of the gender variations and their changes with 
income and allows us to trace out a rough path of how gender differences can vary over 
the life cycle.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a theoretical model 
of parental decision about investments in their children’s human capital. Section 3 
describes the data and welfare indicators we use in our analysis. Section 4 presents the 
descriptive results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses some methodological 
issues of measuring the differences in gender outcomes. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical Models of Gender Differentials in Children’s Human Capital 
Investments  
 
The important question for both researchers and policy makers is what is the underlying 
cause of the observed gender differential and its changes with income. Strauss and 
Thomas (1995) and Alderman and King (1998) review a variety of optimizing models for 
why boys and girls might have different outcomes that can vary with the level of a 
household’s resources. The simplest model assumes that households have strong 
preferences for children of a certain gender, but they are willing to make investments in 
the future earning capacity of their children through education (e.g., Hill and King, 1995; 
Alderman and Gertler, 1997). These models readily exhibit discrimination against one   4
gender and in favor of the other. At low levels of income, for example, investments in 
boys could be larger than investments in girls, even though the marginal rate of return to 
the investment in boys may be lower. In their model this would happen because the 
parent’s place more value on the boy’s well being. With diminishing returns to 
investments in boys, as income rises and boys receive relatively more schooling, the 
boy’s marginal return to investments falls. Parents increase their investments in girls 
relative to boys leading to more equality at higher incomes. Alderman and King also 
discuss a model where intra-household gender equality by itself is a normal good, in 
addition to preferences for boys over girls. Here, one need not rely on the assumption of 
decreasing marginal returns in order to obtain gender convergence with income. Such 
models based on “tastes for discrimination” do not readily admit reversals in the direction 
of gender “biases” holding wealth constant.  
There are many alternative formulations that can provide empirically testable 
predictions about the sources of aggregate gender differences and their variations with 
income. Such models, however, must make some assumptions about the constraints, 
opportunities, costs, and shocks that can give rise to gender differences. Models based 
purely on random shocks, for example, can give rise to gender differentials within a 
household, but they cannot explain persistent gender differentials within or across 
societies.  
Non-discriminatory, maximizing models that imply gender differentials usually 
assume that differentials arise because of gains from the specialization of labor by gender 
(Becker 1981). For example, if women have a biological, relative advantage in raising 
and caring for children, then in many circumstances it would be efficient for women to 
specialize in child-raising/caring activities and any other activities that could be 
complementary with child-care activities. Since men are at a relative disadvantage in 
childrearing, they would tend to concentrate their activities on providing for the family 
through other means than caring for their children (Alderman and King 1998; Garg and 
Morduch 1998). 
As the range of activities for work outside of the home expands, or as good 
substitutes for child-care arise, or as complementarities with child-care activities 
decrease, one would expect the relative disadvantage of men in home activities to   5
diminish. Any of these events would tend to lead to more equality between the sexes in 
labor force and home activities. One would expect more developed economies to have an 
expanded set of opportunities, so one would in general expect to find smaller differences 
between the outcomes for men and women in developed than in developing counties. 
Even within a given society, gender differences may vary across wealth classes. 
The relative disadvantage of men in household activities, for example, could be a 
function of the household’s wealth. Depending on the “scale economies” in household 
production, the relative advantage of women’s work in the household could either rise or 
fall with changes in wealth, leading to a convergence or a divergence of women’s and 
men’s labor market outcomes with changes in wealth. 
Most important for our analysis are households’ decisions to invest in human 
capital. Since specialization in any activity typically implies costly and considerable 
investments, gender differentials in early investments can result in large gender 
differentials later in life. Consider a simple three period, life cycle economic model 
where parents make decisions about investments in the one boy and the one girl in the 
family at period one. The household gives up current consumption at period one for 
future utility flows that depend on the amounts invested in the boy and the girl during that 
time period. There are two kinds of investments the parents can make in their children: 
one is an investment in human capital that pays off in the formal labor market, the other 
is an investment in human capital that is valuable only in home production. During time 
period two, the prime adult years, the investments in both types of human capital begin to 
pay off. Period three constitutes the retirement years, and only home production human 
capital provides a direct return. The model we develop here is a simple extension of those 
in Behrman at el. (1982) and Garg and Morduch (1998). 
At time period one the parents care about the utility flows their children receive in 
periods two and three. We assume, because of comparative advantages in childrearing for 
women, that in period two women will have a higher return to home production human 
capital and men will have a higher return to labor market human capital. The economic 
model we use, however, only requires that parents perceive gender-specific returns in 
different types of human capital investments. Let these returns be denoted by rg,k where g 
indicates gender (G or B) and k equal to H denotes the returns to home production human   6
capital and k equal to M denotes the return to formal labor market specific human capital. 
When retired, labor market human capital is no longer valued. Since both men and 
women specialize in home production during retirement, we assume that the returns to 
home production capital are identical for men and women in period three.  
The human capital production functions are identical for men and women, as are 
the costs of inputs. The labor market human capital production function is f(Ms), s=G,B. 
Let cM be the per unit cost of inputs to this production function; cM
..Ms, then, is the 
amount spent on the input Ms for the child of gender s for the production of labor market 
human capital. Similarly the production function for home human capital is g(Hs) where 
cH
..Hs is the amount spent on the input Hs for the child of gender s. Each production 
function is increasing with higher inputs, with diminishing returns. Let the parent’s 
current utility be given by U(X), where parents can give up some consumption X for 
investments in their children’s human capital.  
The household discounts total production at time periods two and three using the 
value functions V2[.] and V3[.] and it considers labor market earnings to be perfectly 
substitutable with home production. We assume that the value functions V2[.] and V3[.] 
have positive first derivatives and negative second derivatives. The formal optimization 
model facing the parents at time period one is then: 
 
where  Y is exogenously provided income to the household. Recall that we assumed 
gender specific differentials in the returns to the two types of human capital at time 
period two. Specifically, rB,M > rG,M and rB,H<rG,H
1
. These assumptions, along with the 
concavity assumptions on the human capital production functions and the future value 
functions are sufficient to generate important gender differences in investments. They 
                                                 
1 These restrictions on the magnitudes of the “returns” need not be interpreted as differences in productivity 
per unit of time devoted to labor market and household activities. It could be the case that men and women 
would be equally productive per unit of time in an activity, provided there were identical investments in the 
men and the women. Then, if women had a comparative advantage in child-rearing, the perceived return to 
women in labor market activities would reflect their lower hours of work and result in these inequalities in 
overall returns.  
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also imply specific life-cycle profiles of gender differentials in earnings and home 
production. Throughout our discussion of the model’s implications, we assume that it is 
always optimal to increase human capital investments of both types of human capital (for 
both genders) with increases in income (i.e., no corner solutions). 
Solving the first order conditions for the choices of period-one investments in the 
two types of human capital for boys and girls, assuming an interior optimum, yields two 
important implications: 
1
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Given the assumptions about concavity and the relationships of the gender specific rates 
of return to human capital in the two sectors, these relationships imply larger investments 
in labor market human capital for boys than girls (i.e., MB> MG) and larger investments in 
household human capital for girls than for boys (i.e., HG >HB). These differential 
investments in human capital during the first period have strong implications for   
analyzing the relative income effects.  
Looking first at the conditions defining optimal investments in the labor market 
specific human capital, we find: 
where M*** falls between MG and MH. Convergence in the investment in the labor market 
specific human capital between boys and girls will occur when the above expression is 
greater then 1. Since the ratio of the gender specific returns to human capital, rB,M/rG,M, is 
greater than 1 by assumption, the magnitude of the expression depends on the second 
term in this equation. If f’’’(M)  ≤ 0 , then increases in period one income will 
unambiguously result in a convergence in investments in labor market human capital for 
boys and girls. Even if f’’’(M) > 0, as long as the third derivative is small relative to the 
second derivative then the overall expression will exceed one. This means that increases 
in income in period one will result typically in a convergence of the household’s gender-
specific investments in children’s labor market human capital. A primary rationale behind 
this result of convergence for investments in boys and girls as income rises follows from 
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two factors. The first is diminishing returns in investments. This, in conjunction with the 
fact that the household invests less in girls’ labor market human capital, makes it less 
costly at the margin to produce additional human capital for girls then it is to produce 
more labor market human capital for boys. The second factor follows from the second 
term of the above expression; the restrictions on the third derivatives ensure that the 
diminishing returns do not become less important at higher investment levels.  
The comparative advantage of women in home production ensures that a 
household will invest more in girls’ household human capital than in boys’. This simple 
economic model implies similar convergence results for the household’s decisions to 
invest in the home production human capital of boys and girls. The results, however, are 
not as straightforward as they are for labor market human capital because household 
production human capital pays off differently in the prime aged years and the retirement 
years for both men and women. Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to 
the household’s income level when the investment decisions are made and rearranging 
terms yields: 
Where Vt’ and Vt’’ are the first and second derivatives of period-t specific indirect utility 
functions, and the At are the points of evaluation (period specific incomes) for these 
indirect utility functions (i.e.,  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , , 2 G H G B H B G M G B M B H g r H g r M f r M f r A + + + =  
and ) ) ( ) ( ( 3 G B H g H g A + =τ  evaluated at the optimal choices). 
In general it is not possible to sign unambiguously the difference in the income 
effects for the investments in boys’ and girls’ household production human capital. But 
under the assumption that the household maximizes lifetime income, V2’’= V3’’=0, and 
the ratio of the income effects is: 
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the first term on the right is unambiguously greater than one. The magnitude of the 
second term, while positive, again depends on the third derivative of the human capital 
production function. Similar to the examination of the differences in the income effects 
for the demands for labor market human capital,  
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where H*** falls between HG and HB. If the third derivative of the production function is 
negative, or if the positive third derivative is small relative to the absolute magnitude of 
the second derivative, then there will be a convergence in the investments made in boys’ 
and girls’ household human capital at higher income levels
2.  
   In summary, this simple theoretical model gives rise to gender differentials in 
parents' investments in their children's labor market and household production human 
capital. Our formulation of the model relied upon different marginal returns to 
investments in boys' and girls' human capital, but it is important to note that it is only the 
parent's perceptions of these differences in returns that matter. Additionally, the model 
does not require there to be actual differences in returns for boys and girls in either the 
labor market or home production. For example, suppose parents believe that it is like for 
girls to spend less time in the labor market than boys when they are adults, and for them 
to expect just the opposite for home production. Such differences in the time inputs arise 
easily from the specialization of labor in household and labor market tasks due to women 
having only a minor biological advantage in child rearing (e.g., breastfeeding). These 
time-use differentials give rise to the types of differential rates of return we assumed, 
even though boys have no absolute advantage in the labor market. Boys could, in fact, 
have worse labor market prospects than girls. The comparative advantage of girls in 
                                                 
2 In our model we make an implicit assumption that the rates of return on both types of human capital, rs,M 
and rs,H, do not depend on the household income. Several studies examining differential returns to human 
capital investments by income level (e.g., MacIsaac and Patrinos 1995; van der Walle and Gunewardena 
2000) found that the returns to schooling are lower for marginalized and usually poor groups in the 
population. Additionally, the returns in the labor market might depend on the connections and networks, 
which, in turn, could be related to household income (Filmer 2000). While such differences in one’s ability 
to reap benefits from human capital investments are important, we have insufficient data to model gender 
differentials in the reasons for differences in rates of return with income, wealth, or class. Instead, we only 
trace out how outcomes related to gender differentials in investments vary with income level.   10
childrearing could easily tip the tables so that the perceived returns to investments in 
labor market skills for boys, recognizing the gains from specialization, are larger. 
    We also discuss how these gender differentials in investments vary with the 
household's wealth. In our model with parents only caring about the future earnings 
prospects of their children, the gender differentials in investments will depend on both the 
actual functional form of the parents' preferences over their children's future 
consumptions and, more importantly for investments in labor market human capital,  on 
the actual functional form for the human capital production function.  
   Not surprisingly, it is impossible to describe the direction of change in gender 
differentials as parents' wealth increases without stronger assumptions than concavity in 
the human capital production functions. However, if diminishing returns to human capital 
investments are not too much smaller at higher investment levels (e.g., as for an 
approximately quadratic production function), then this model predicts that the gender 
differential in labor market human capital investments will decline with increases in 
incomes. Furthermore, if parents attempt to maximize the present value of the sum of 
their children's real incomes, then one would also expect to see a convergence in 
household human capital investments at higher wealth levels. In the remainder of this 
paper we test whether these retrictions appear to be valid. 
 
3.  Data and definitions 
 
Our analysis is based on Bosnia Living Standard Monitoring Survey (BLSMS) – the first 
nation-wide regionally representative survey to measure both monetary and non-
monetary components of household welfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The survey was 
conducted in September-November 2001 by three statistical organizations in Bosnia with 
financial and technical support from Department for International Development of 
England (DfID), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Japanese 
Government, and the World Bank. The survey sample comprises 5,397 households in two 
entities: 2,395 households in the Republica Serbska, and 3,002 in the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The survey is representative at the national and entity level as   11
well as by the type of municipality
3. BLSMS questionnaire collected information on a 
wide range of individual and household level indicators that included data on household 
consumption, migration, access to and use of government services, information about 
individual characteristics of the household members, and other important indicators. In 
addition, price data covering 37 essential commodities were collected in the selected 
enumeration areas.  
As the primary indicator of household wealth we use the value of the total 
household expenditures. Total household expenditure consists of food consumption 
(including purchased, home-produced, and food received as a gift) plus non-food 
consumption that includes imputed values for housing, expenditures on utilities, health, 
education and other types of non-food consumptions of goods and services. Summary 
statistics for the main variables used in our analysis are shown in Table 1. 
 
4.  An Empirical Investigation of the Impacts of Income on Gender Differentials 
in Human Capital Accumulation. 
 
In this section we examine a range of early life-cycle investments outcomes to determine 
whether the convergence of gender differentials extends to a wide range of outcomes and 
to uncover the magnitude of these effects. Our theoretical model, in its most general 
form, yields ambiguous predictions whether increases in income should lead to 
convergence or divergence in investments in the human capitals of boys and girls. In a 
wide variety of configurations, however, the economic model does imply a convergence 
of investment outcomes for boys and girls with increases in parental income. We use 
these model implications as a compelling reason to test for the presence of gender-wealth 
interactions for investments and outcome over the life cycle. Another reason for 
suspecting that the gender convergence with higher incomes is a likely outcome comes 
from the existing literature examining gender inequality in school attendance. The 
evidence presented in that literature finds diminishing gender differences at higher wealth 
levels (e.g., Jacoby 1994; Berhmen and Knowles 1997; Lloyd Mete and Zathar 2002). A 
                                                 
3 Further details on the survey design and field methods used can be found in the Word Bank (2002).    12
paper by Deaton (1997) suggests a possible gender convergence with wealth in 
nutritional status for boys and girls in Bangladesh. 
Before examining the implications of the economic model, we analyze outcomes 
associated for pre-school age children. This serves as a baseline for our analysis of more 
investment-oriented outcomes. Then, following our economic model, the empirical 
analysis in this paper focuses on three distinct phases of the life cycle. We first 
investigate gender-wealth differentials for children, at those ages when significant human 
capital investments take place. Next, we look at the gender-wealth interactions in 
outcomes for prime aged adults. We assume that these differentials would reflect 
differences in investments made when these adults were children. Third, we examine 
gender-wealth outcomes for retirement-aged individuals, under the assumption that these 




Prior to age seven, there are also no obvious gender differentials in schooling or childcare 
arrangements in Bosnia. Few children attend kindergartens, and household members 
provide most childcare. Wealthier families are somewhat more likely to use non-
household member care for their children, but the number of children attending 
kindergartens are too small to make any statistically sound inferences (World Bank 
2002). These activities have only slight investment components, and the evidence 
suggests no gender differences or discrimination along these dimensions. 
We start off our empirical analysis by examining gender differentials in spending 
on young children (ages 0 to 6) by households for less investment-related goods. This 
exploration is important, as it can provide key information about whether one might 
consider the gender differentials in investments to be determined by discrimination or by 
perceptions about differential returns to the investments by gender. The next section 
examines in detail the household wealth variations in school attendance by gender.  
Our first outcome of interest is a household’s consumption of fruits and sweets. 
While these are not directly “children” goods and cannot be explicitly linked to the 
consumption of these items by a particular household member, we expect that children’s   13
consumption would comprise a significant fraction of the household’s overall expenditure 
on fruits and sweets. Table 2 presents the mean per capita expenditures on fruits and 
sweets by expenditure quintiles, gender, and entity
4. The cross-tabulation analysis shown 
in the top part of Table 2 indicates that better-off household with children ages 0 to 6 
spend more on sweets and fruits than poorer households. Households residing in FBiH 
spend on average more of these goods than the households from RS. However, there 
seem to be no differences between expenditures on sweets and fruits between boys and 
girls both in either RS or FBiH. 
The regression analysis on the bottom part of Table 2 reconfirms these findings in 
a somewhat simpler framework. The coefficient on the household expenditure variable is 
positive and statistically significant indicating that higher expenditure households spend 
more on fruits and sweets. The coefficient on the entity dummy shows a negative and 
statistically significant effect of living in RS on expenditures on sweets and fruits.  
Of most importance for this study, both the gender indicator and the variable that 
represents the interaction between the gender and household per capita expenditure are 
small. Neither is statistically significant and we fail to reject the hypothesis that both are 
zero at conventional significance levels. There is apparently no difference in the 
household spending on fruits and sweets between families with only boys and families 
with only girls at all levels of total household expenditure. A simple extension of our 
economic model to incorporate children’s consumption as a separable component of 
utility, with the parents’ only reasons for treating boys and girls differently arising from 
investment considerations, would imply no gender differentials for such pure 
consumption goods. We take this empirical finding to mean that gender discrimination 
does not exist for this set of expenditures. 
Table 3 shows the mean per child expenditure on children’s shoes and clothing by 
entity and expenditure quintile
5. Focusing first on the cross-tabulation results, we see that 
typically households with small children in FBiH spend more on their children’s shoes 
                                                 
4 Table 2 is based on the sample to the households that have as children only boys or only girls age 0 to 6. 
The regression results presented in these and all other tables in this section are estimated taking into 
account the complex survey design of BLSMS. In the tables where we examine the relationship between 
the household expenditures on children goods and household welfare, we use a total household expenditure 
net of the corresponding expenditures as a household welfare indicator. 
5 Again, we focus on households with only pre-school boys or only pre-school girls.     14
and clothing than do households in RS. In RS households from all expenditures quintile 
spend more on boys than on girls, except at the lowest expenditure levels. In FBiH the 
picture is less clear. The poorest households seem to spend much more on boys’ clothing 
and shoes than on girls’, but at the same time, households from the second and fourth 
quintiles of the expenditure distribution spend more on girls.  
The results of the regression analysis shown in bottom part of Table 3 can help to 
clarify the relationship between the expenditures on children’ shoes and clothing and the 
household wealth. Expenditures on boys are higher, but the interaction effect of 
household expenditure and gender shows strong negative effect that is significant at over 
a 5% significance level against the primary alternative of a decline in the gender 
differential with wealth. This indicates that less of additional income is spent on boys’ 
goods than on girls’. Given the earlier results, it is somewhat surprising to find a gender 
differential favoring boys at these young ages, unless there is an investment component to 
these clothing expenditures. It is important to note, however, that a joint test of no gender 




When the children enter school, substantive gender and wealth differences begin to arise. 
The school attendance patterns of children age 7-15 are shown on Table 4. In FBiH 
almost all children 7-15 were attending school during this year. The rate of school 
attendance in RS is slightly lower than in FBiH. The probit estimates in the bottom panel 
of Table 4 show the relationship between the wealth of the household, gender, and the 
probability that its children are in school. The negative coefficient on the interaction term 
between expenditure and gender indicates that the gap between the boys and girls in 
attendance rates is decreasing with higher levels of household per capita expenditures. 
This effect is significant at the five percent level against the alternative of gender 
convergence with income. Unlike the two outcomes examined for pre-school children, 
here the joint hypothesis of no gender effects is resoundingly rejected.  There does appear 
to be a significant gender gap in investments in human capital that has a strong labor 
market aspect, and this gap diminishes in families with higher levels of expenditures.   15
Looking at the proportion of students among the respondents age 15 to 30 (Table 
5), males in this age group are more likely to attend school than females. Young adults 
from the poor households attend school at significantly lower rates than males and 
females of the same age group from the wealthier families. It is, however, important to 
note that the interpretation of these absolute income effects could be contaminated by the 
fact that some young people have chosen to live separately from their parents because 
they are no longer in school. One would expect such individuals to have lower incomes.
6 
The gender difference in the fraction in school declines with higher per capita 
expenditure.  
The bottom panel of the Table 5 demonstrates the results of the probit estimation 
for the probability of being a student. The results in this table confirm the conclusion of 
the cross-tabulation. The negative sign and significance of the coefficient on the 
interaction between household per capita expenditure and gender indicates the declining 
with wealth differential between males and females in this age category. Again, there is a 
significant convergence of young men’s and young women’s school enrollment rates at 
higher levels of income. 
 
Labor market outcomes. 
 
One of the predictions of our economic model implies more gender inequality in labor 
market outcomes among those who grew up in poorer families than among those who 
grew up in wealthier families. This would happen because of the larger gender 
differentials in labor market human capital investments by the poor. With cross-sectional 
data like that available in the BLSMS, measures of wealth when an adult was a child are 
typically not available. But if there is much inter-generational persistence in wealth and 
positive assortative mating by household wealth, then current measures of a household’s 
income could provide a good proxy for income in one’s family when early investment 
decisions were made. Such an approach, however, does suffer from the fact that several 
of the individual, gender specific outcomes we examine are related to both a household’s 
                                                 
6 For example, in RS only 20% of males and 8% of females age 15 to 30 from the poorest households are 
students, while among the richest households that proportion reaches 42% for males and 45% for females.   16
income and individuals’ labor market outcomes. This could potentially cause serious 
interpretation problems when we examine how variations in wealth appear related to the 
outcomes from earlier investments. To partially overcome this shortcoming, we examine 
gender variations in the prime-aged adult outcomes as functions of one’s own and/or 
one’s spouse’s education level. This removes the direct link, say, between a household’s 
income and the working status of an adult female in the household and makes it easier for 
one to interpret the changes in gender effects with wealth. In this next set of tables, we 
use the term “welfare” to signify that we are using one of these alternative approaches to 
proxy for household income when a youth. 
  We start the analysis of labor market outcomes by looking at the changes in the 
levels of labor force participation among men and women. Table 6 shows the results of 
estimation of the probability of being in the labor force by various proxies of wealth 
(along with the squares of the proxies) when an adult was a child. The first column of 
estimates is based on the position (percentile) of the individual in the educational 
distribution in his/her own age and gender group
7. Using this variable as a proxy for past 
household wealth, the probit results show that the rate of labor force participation (LFP) 
among prime-age adults is higher among men than among women. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term of wealth and gender indicates 
that the differential in male and females rates of LFP is declining with higher wealth.  
A similar picture emerges when we use educational percentiles of the spouse as a 
proxy of household wealth for when the individual was a child. The negative and 
significant coefficient on the Male-Welfare interaction term suggests that the gender gap 
in the levels of LFP is smaller for the individuals who grew up in the richer households. 
The last set of coefficients in Table 6 is based on an instrumental-variable (IV) linear 
probability model where we instrument the current wealth (total household expenditure 
per capita) with the both own and the spouse’s education. In this specification we assume 
that all three variables that involve household wealth (per capita expenditure, per capita 
expenditure squared, and the interaction term) are endogenous. Again, as in the previous 
two estimations we observe higher rates of LFP among males (the coefficient is positive 
                                                 
7 The percentiles of education distribution were calculated for 5-year age group separately for males and 
females.    17
and statistically significant) and among adults living in FBiH. While the coefficient on 
the interaction term is statistically insignificant, its sign does imply the same negative 
correlation between the gender gap in employment rates and household wealth. 
  Table 7 shows the effects of past household wealth on the level of wages using 
the same three approaches. For all three estimations, based on one’s own education, and 
spouse education, and IV regression estimation, males earn significantly higher wages 
than females. At the same time, the statistical significance of the negative coefficients on 
the interaction term in these regressions suggests that the wage gender differential 




The theoretical model also has predictions about gender differentials that would become 
apparent during retirement years. Since at these later ages labor market human capital has 
become much less important, many of the outcomes one could observe would be due to 
differences in investments in household production human capital. We examine two sets 
of outcomes to assess whether there appears to be evidence of gender differentials in 
household production human capital that varies by level of wealth. The first set concerns 
health related issues, and the second set attempts to capture the ability of an elderly 
person to take care of their own home. 
  We use a common regression framework for examining how gender differentials 
in these outcomes vary with wealth. In particular, we regress, either by probit or OLS, an 
outcome of interest on a second degree polynomial in household per capita income, the 
elderly person’s age, an dummy variable indicating whether the person lived in RS, and a 
male dummy variable and an interaction between the male dummy variable and per 
capita income. We interpret the coefficient on the interaction between the male dummy 
and the income measure as an indicator of how investments in household human capital 
variable vary by income level. It is important to note that in this part of the analysis we 
use the household’s current income as a proxy for the wealth of the family in which the 
elderly person grew up.   18
  Table 8 contains the coefficients for the male dummy variable and the interaction 
of the male dummy variable and per capita income for seven different outcomes
8. We 
focus on persons aged 61-74. The first outcome we examine is a dummy variable for 
whether the elderly person suffered from any chronic disease. We hypothesize that higher 
level of household human capital would lead to better health investments, so a lower 
incidence of chronic diseases would be indicative of higher levels of household human 
capital. From the first row of Table 8 we see that at low income levels men are more 
likely than women to suffer from a chronic disease, but as income rises the female 
advantage in household human capital declines. We consider this weak support for the 
notion suggested by the theoretical model that wealthier families made more equal 
investments in their children’s human capital investments, across genders, than did poor 
families. 
  The second row of Table 8 examines whether an elderly person visited a general 
practitioner during the past four weeks. We posit two interpretations for an increased 
incidence of doctor visits. In the first, we consider doctor visits to be substitutes for 
household human capital in the production of health, and in the second, higher levels of 
doctor visits indicate worse health. For either scenario, lower levels of doctor’s visits 
would indicate higher levels of household human capital. Both the male effect and the 
male-income interaction operate to support the notion that women have higher levels of 
household human capital at low income levels and their advantage diminishes at higher 
income levels. The statistical significance levels of the separate effects, however, are 
smaller than their joint significance level. The third row of Table 8 examines whether an 
elderly person, on his or her own initiative, purchased any drugs to treat a health problem. 
Again, the two coefficients of interest suggest higher levels of household human capital 
for poor women than for poor men, with this advantage diminishing at higher income 
levels. 
  The next set of issues we attempt to examine is the ability of an elderly person to 
take care of household chores. We have no direct evidence on this type of outcome, but 
we consider a single, widowed, or divorced elderly individuals who lives on his or her 
own as one possible measure of higher levels of household human capital. The point 
                                                 
8 Complete regressions for these outcomes are available from authors on request.   19
estimates presented in the fourth row of Table 8 support the notion that women’s 
advantage in household human capital diminishes with income levels, but the results are 
not statistically significant. 
  Finally we examine purchases of particular goods by elderly persons living alone 
as indicators of the level of their household human capital. The fifth row in Table 8 
examines the amount spent on meals purchased outside the home during the past seven 
days. While the pattern of the gender coefficients for expenditures on purchased meals 
suggest that the gender differential declines with income, none of these effects are 
statistically significant. The last two rows of Table 8 look at expenditures on cleaning 
products during the past month and ownership of a clothes washer among those living 
alone. We interpret higher levels of thee outcomes to indicate higher levels of household 
human capital. The point estimates suggest a convergence of household human capital 
levels at higher income levels, but the evidence is not as strong as it is for the health 
related outcomes.  
  The implication of the theoretical model that there would be a convergence in the 
levels of household human capital investments between boys and girls with household 
income does receive some support from this examination of elderly persons’ health and 
abilities to care for a separate household. Women appear to have an advantage in 
outcomes associated with household production human capital at low income levels, and 
this advantage deciles as income rises. The strongest evidence is for health related 
outcomes, but there is also some weak evidence in support of the theoretical model when 
we examined the determinants of living alone and household chore-related purchases 
among those living alone.  
 
5.  Ambiguities in Ascertaining the Direction and Magnitude of Changes in 
Gender Inequality 
 
When examining changes in inequality for a particular economic outcome, researchers 
almost always focus on only a single way of measuring the economic outcome. The 
choice of how to measure is arbitrary, yet simple monotonic transformations of the 
measure of the outcome of interest can often reverse one’s decision about whether a set   20
of observed changes should be considered a convergence or a divergence in inequality or 
outcomes. This implies that how one perceives the “value” of particular economic 
outcomes can have a profound impact on whether one considers a particular set of 
observed changes as indicative of an increase in inequality, a decrease in inequality, or an 
inequality neutral set of changes.  
In this section we use a simple example to demonstrate how researchers could 
reach different conclusions about convergence or divergence in inequality even when 
examining exactly the same data. Such ambiguities can arise from something as simple as 
changing the method of measuring inequality from an absolute measure to a proportional 
measure. This is an important issue because it means that an analyst cannot provide 
appropriate information to policy makers without knowing precisely the metric for 
measuring inequality that that the policy maker believes is correct.  
To examine gender-poverty interactions one might compare how investments in 
education for young boys and girls vary as a function of household income. As a 
hypothetical example, suppose one observes that at all household income levels boys 
always have a 10-percentage points higher school enrollment rate than girls. This 
situation is graphed in Figure 1(A). 
If an absolute difference in school enrollments is the appropriate inequality 
measure to use, then the horizontal line labeled “Gap” on Figure 1(B) describes society’s 
perception of the differential between boys’ and girls’ enrollment rates. This specification 
implies that the absolute level of enrollment at different incomes has no impact on how 
society perceives the gender differential in rates of enrollment. Given this way of valuing 
school enrollment, the observed differential at various income levels is a pure gender 
effect with no income interaction. Society in this instance considers a 20-10 differential 
in enrollment rates (i.e. a 100% relative differential) the same as a 90-80 differential (a 
12.5% relative differential). 
Instead, one could specify that the appropriate way to measure inequality is in a 
relative sense, namely the enrollment rate for girls as a fraction of the enrollment rate for 
boys.  The line labeled “Ratio” on Figure 1(B) graphs this inequality measure for the 
gender specific enrollment rates displayed in Figure 1(A) as a function of income. The 
above 20-10 differential (with girls having only half the enrollment rate of boys) is   21
perceived to be a substantially larger differential than the 90-80 differential where the 
relative enrollment rate for girls is only 11.1% lower than it is for boys. With this method 
of measuring inequality, there is now strong evidence of gender inequality decreasing 
with income, even though the same observed differential implied income neutrality of the 
gender gap for the same “data” with a reasonable, alternative measure of inequality.  
As a real-world example, consider the differential in levels of LFP between males 
and females in Bosnia, shown in Figure 2. This picture is very similar to the one on 
Figure 1. Given the precision of our estimates, the gender gap in the levels of LFP is 
almost constant across the income percentiles. The gender ratio dynamics, however, 
indicates a strong gender-poverty interaction. If one would focus on the relative measure 
of gender inequality, policy measures that target poor households in Bosnia would be 
more effective in reducing labor force participation gender differential. On the other 
hand, a policymaker concerned with absolute measures of inequality would find no 
reason for such interventions. 
The absolute and relative inequality measures just examined are only two of a 
wide variety of measures one could deem appropriate for specifying the level of 
inequality. In general, as long as the observed outcomes for both groups experience 
trends in the same direction, it is likely that different, reasonable measures of inequality 
could yield different conclusions about the direction of the trend in inequality. This is 
clearly a serious shortcoming. As researchers, we typically have no reason to select one 
way to measure gender differences over another without a clear theoretical justification 
for why one measure is preferable. 
It is, however, necessary for one to pick an inequality metric for displaying how 
the between group outcomes vary across another dimension. One might be able to 
uncover instances of income neutrality in gender differences, for example, but it is 
important to recognize that a policy maker’s preferences might correspond to a different 
metric with different implications about the relationship of gender differences to wealth. 
The evidences on the differences in gender differentials by poverty status that we 
presented in the previous section are clearly subject to this criticism. Without more 
precise knowledge of the social valuations of the characteristics we examined, it is   22
typically impossible to state unambiguously even the direction of the change in 
inequality. 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
The goal of this study was to examine how a spectrum of gender differentials varies 
across income groups over the life cycle.  We intentionally refrained from using the term 
“discrimination” because it is very hard to capture from the household expenditure 
surveys and because we thought it useful to examine whether simple, household utility-
maximizing models could produce testable implications. This is clearly a first step 
towards an understanding of why gender differences in outcomes vary with the level of 
household income. We found rather convincing evidence of declining gender differentials 
for household investments in labor market human capital and labor market outcomes for 
men and women when household income rises. At the same time, our findings about the 
trends for investments in home production capital are less compelling. The limitations of 
this study to a large degree come from insufficient data. Our results would be much more 
robust if information about family backgrounds, parent’s socio-economic status, and 
place of residence before age of 15 is available for each member of the household. 
Clearly, more research and better data are needed to investigate the important 
phenomenon of the relation of gender and poverty. 
The theoretical model developed in this paper provides only ambiguous 
predictions about the direction of the changes in gender differentials when household 
income rises. At the same time, the model indicates that in many situations outcomes for 
male and females should converge for the households with higher incomes. Our empirical 
analysis found evidence consistent with this hypothesis. In BiH gender inequality across 
a wide range of outcomes is decreasing with household income. Focusing on primary 
socioeconomic outcomes that highlight the interactions of gender and poverty throughout 
the lifecycle, we uncover strong gender-poverty effects in the patterns of labor force 
participation, differences in earnings, individuals’ school finances and school attendance. 
Not in all cases are women in BiH at a disadvantage.   23
  In pointing out the strong connection between parental investment in human 
capital of the children and household income, this paper suggests that early life 
experiences can have lasting impact on gender inequality. The main source of gender 
inequality seems to come from different investments in girls’ and boys’ educations that 
increase with declines in income levels. Because of this, short-term income shocks could 
lead to long-term increases in gender inequality in households with school age children, 
unless there is ready access to credit markets. In Bosnia interventions such as student 
loans or stipends, similar to Mexican Progresa Poverty Program (e.g., Schultz 2001), 
could be effective in decreasing gender inequality in educational achievements and future 
gender inequality in the labor market. 
Our analysis found clear evidence of gender differentials even for primary school-
aged children, suggesting that such interventions might need to include households with 
pre-teenaged children. We also found evidence that girls in poor households are less 
likely to finish secondary school than boys, while at ages 19-21 the gender differential 
reverses for those who finished secondary school. To reduce future labor market 
inequality, programs will need to convince girls to finish secondary school. Rewards for 
graduating might be effective. It might also be necessary to subsidize on post-secondary 
schooling for men, perhaps in the form of low cost loans. At the same time, income 
fluctuations in the households with preschool children do not seem to affect the gender 
differences, as important gender differentials appear to arise only when the children reach 
school age.  
Single adults, especially the single elderly, should be of concern. Single women 
that come from poor households could be at a great risk of poverty. Lack of labor market 
human capital would not allow them to succeed on their own, and the low levels of 
household income would adversely affect the life prospects of children growing up in the 
family with a low educated single mother (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1994).  Single men 
and widowers living alone, given the lack of experience in the home activities, could be 
at great risk. It may be important to construct programs to assist older men living alone or 
to institute programs that induce these older men to move in with relatives.  
Does gender equality affect growth, or economic growth cause greater gender 
equality, or both? Most of the literature on this topic uses macro data to determine the   24
direction of causality (e.g., Barro and Lee 1994; Dollar and Gatti 1999; Klasen 1999). 
Our micro-level findings indicate that economic growth could lead to greater gender 
equality. The magnitude of the impact of economic development on gender differences 
will depend on where the growth is concentrated. If the poor capture at least some 
benefits of economic growth, the gender differences in household investment in human 
capital of their children will decline. This could have a profound effect on well-being of 
population on all stages of a life cycle. If, on the other hand, growth is concentrated 
among the richest, then important gender disparities could remain pervasive.  
BiH experienced a substantial economic growth during the last several years. Its 
economy has almost recovered from the war, and life of Bosnian population is 
normalizing. The economic development in Bosnia can open many channels for 
increasing the gender equality. Whether this potential is realized depends on the ability of 
Bosnian Government to promote economic growth among all groups of population.   25
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Washington Table 1: Summary statistics 
  RS FBiH 
  Mean N*  Mean  N 
Household characteristics   Weighted Unweighted    Weighted  Unweighted   
Household size  4.09 3.23 2381  4.02 3.07 3001 
Per capita expenditure  2769.30 3161.84  2381  3125.10 3262.43  3001 
Proportion of poor  0.31 0.19  449  0.21 0.17 505 
Proportion of urban   0.19 0.42 1009  0.30 0.66 1981 
Households with children 0-7  0.30 0.20 2381  0.34 0.21 3001 
Households with children 8-14  0.29 0.20  484  0.35 0.22 669 
Households with children 15-21  0.33 0.26  630  0.36 0.26 785 
                   
  Male Female  Male  Female 
  Mean  N Mean N Mean N  Mean N 
Individual characteristics  Weighted Unweighted   Weighted  Unweighted   Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted  Unweighted  
Age  37.18 37.47  3750 40.24 39.36  3939  35.10 35.77 4406 37.40 38.54  4814
Years of education   10.30 10.76  2241 9.57 10.20  2242  10.62 10.88 2657 9.28 9.69  2768
Children 8-14 in school  0.98 0.97  302 0.97 0.97  329  0.99 0.98 860  0.99 0.98  866
Young adults 15-30 continuing education  0.22 0.30  278 0.19 0.22  151  0.32 0.35 383  0.18 0.21  166
Employment  0.64 0.61  1448 0.36 0.39  864  0.53 0.53  1490 0.29 0.30  843
Hourly wage  1.82 2.18  1197 1.51 1.81  753  2.65 2.58  1312 2.44 2.35  750
Elderly living alone  0.06 0.07 51  0.18 0.18  173  0.05 0.07 54  0.21 0.23  242
                     
Note: N is the number of observations in the sampleTable 2: Expenditure on sweets and fruits, by entity, gender and poverty status. 
Households with children younger than 7 years of age. 
Expenditure RS  FBiH 
Per capita  Boys  Girls  Gap  Ratio  Boys Girls  Gap  Ratio 
1 27.98 30.13  -2.15  0.93  32.33 33.28  -0.95  0.97 
2 45.60 44.77  0.83  1.02  53.63 53.73  -0.10  1.00 
3 53.24 55.67  -2.43  0.96  60.88 55.80  5.08  1.09 
4 69.76 69.97  -0.21  1.00  68.36 81.10  -12.74  0.84 
5 89.05 88.47  0.58  1.01  97.25 99.12  -1.87  0.98 
            
Expenditure on sweets and fruits (OLS)  Coefficient  Std. Error      
Boys -1.556  7.448       
Interaction: Expenditure*Boys  -0.002  0.369       
Expenditure per capita  3.197  0.491       
Expenditure per capita
2 -0.019  0.006       
Republica Serbska  -5.484  3.410       
Constant -3.305  7.679       
P-value for an adjusted joint Wald test that            
coefficients on boys and Interaction = 0  0.608         
 
Table 3: Expenditure on children’s clothing and shoes, by entity, gender and poverty 
status. Households with children younger than 7 years of age. 
Expenditure RS  FBiH 
Per capita  Boys  Girls  Gap  Ratio  Boys Girls  Gap  Ratio 
1 73.04 85.37  -12.33  0.86  271.33 82.3  189.03  3.30 
2 146.82 115.14  31.68  1.28  109.41 168.77  -59.36  0.65 
3 161.84 152.83  9.01  1.06  175.83 153.98  21.85  1.14 
4 252.72 205.65  47.07  1.23  209.33 324.04  -114.71  0.65 
5 306.6 276.82  29.78  1.11  353.12 359.07  -5.95  0.98 
            
Expenditure on shoes and clothing (OLS)  Coefficient  Std. Error      
Boys 59.930  39.448       
Interaction: Expenditure*Boys  -3.219  1.677       
Expenditure per capita  16.116  3.270       
Expenditure per capita
2 -0.112  0.038       
Republica Serbska  -15.426  24.021       
Constant -102.624  49.171       
P-value for an adjusted joint Wald test  0.718         
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Table 4: Proportion of children age 7-15 attending school during the year 2000/2001 by 
gender, entity and expenditure per capita quintiles. 
Expenditure RS  FBiH 
Per capita  Boys  Girls  Gap  Ratio  Boys Girls  Gap  Ratio 
1 0.94 0.94  0.00  1.00  0.96 0.96  0.00  1.00 
2 0.95 0.94  0.01  1.01  0.97 0.95  0.02  1.02 
3 0.97 0.97  0.00  1.00  0.99 0.99  0.00  1.00 
4 1.00 0.97  0.03  1.03  0.95 0.99  -0.04  0.96 
5 0.99 0.99  0.00  0.00  1.00 0.99  0.01  1.01 
            
Probability of being in school (Probit)  Coefficient  Std. Error      
Boys 0.292  0.239       
Interaction: Expenditure*Boys  -0.154  0.091       
Expenditure per capita  0.378  0.201       
Expenditure per capita
2 -0.032  0.026       
Republica Serbska  -1.812  0.186       
Constant 1.301  0.343       
P-value for an adjusted joint Wald test  0.000         
 
 
Table 5: Proportion of students among the respondents age 15 to 30 by gender, entity and 
expenditure per capita quintiles. 
Expenditure RS  FBiH 
Per capita  Males  Females  Gap  Ratio  Males Females  Gap  Ratio 
1 0.20 0.08  0.12  2.50  0.33 0.07  0.26  4.71 
2 0.24 0.18  0.06  1.33  0.34 0.12  0.22  2.83 
3 0.28 0.20  0.08  1.40  0.36 0.22  0.14  1.64 
4 0.43 0.38  0.05  1.13  0.34 0.29  0.05  1.17 
5 0.42 0.45  -0.03  0.93  0.46 0.42  0.04  1.10 
            
Probability of being a student (Probit)  Coefficient  Std. Error      
Male 0.192  0.042      
Interaction: Expenditure*Male  -0.036  0.013      
Expenditure per capita  0.100  0.019      
Expenditure per capita
2 -0.006  0.001      
Republica Serbska  -0.046  0.027      
Constant -0.013  0.047      
P-value for an adjusted joint Wald test that           
coefficients on Male and Interaction = 0  0.000        
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Table 6: Probability of Being in the Labor Force by welfare indicator, gender and type of 
locality. Sample of individuals 15 to 55 years old.  
Welfare Measure: 
Own education rank with 
Probit 
Spouse’s education rank 
with Probit  
Household income with IV 
LPM estimation 
   Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Male 1.354  0.148  1.275  0.149  0.832  0.141 
Interaction: Welfare*Male  -0.709  0.238  -0.660  0.250  -0.151  0.173 
Welfare indicator  0.483  0.552  1.084  0.452  0.460  0.022 
Welfare indicator
2 0.073  0.039  -0.529  0.410  -0.035  0.141 
Republica Serbska  0.255  0.095  0.285  0.094  0.120  0.039 
Years of education  0.014  0.027  0.097  0.016  0.024  0.006 
Constant -1.159  0.233  -1.721  0.202  -0.904  0.278 
P-value for an adjusted Wald test  0.000    0.000    0.000   
 
Table 7: Wage by welfare indicator, gender and type of locality. Sample of individuals 15 
to 55 years old. 
Welfare measure 
 
Own education rank 
 
Spouse education rank 
  
Household income with IV 
estimation 
Wage (OLS)   Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Male 0.477  0.089  0.392  0.109  0.052  0.009 
Interaction: Welfare*Male  -0.494  0.152  -0.360  0.184  -0.121  0.065 
Welfare indicator  -0.870  0.245  -0.042  0.437  0.034  0.256 
Welfare indicator
2 0.113  0.015  0.453  0.345  0.027  0.032 
Republica Serbska  -0.399  0.055  -0.397  0.054  0.658  0.216 
Years of education  0.029  0.016  0.073  0.006  -0.327  0.055 
Constant -0.005  0.117  -0.333  0.140  -0.516  0.484 
P-value for an adjusted Wald test  0.000    0.000    0.000   
 
Table 8: Male and Male-Income Interaction Coefficients for Elderly Outcomes 
  Male Dummy   Male Dummy times per 
capita expenditure 
p-value for 
Wald test that 
both equal 0 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.   
Health outcomes         
Chronic Disease (probit)  0.107  0.149  -0.093  0.034  0.000 
Visit a General Practitioner (probity)  0.134  0.169  -0.071  0.041  0.031 
Purchase Non-Presciption Drugs (Probit)  0.156  0.142  -0.078  0.037  0.023 
Household chores            
Live Alone (probit)  -0.179  0.408  0.018  0.123  0.701 
Spending on Meals (OLS)  3.194  5.294  -0.478  1.218  0.378 
Purchases of Cleaning Products (OLS)  -4.4661  2.248  0.999  0.549  0.099 
Ownership of Clothes Washer (probit)  -0.572  0.554  0.121  0.098  0.456 
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Figure 2: (Panel A) Rates of Employment for men and women age 15-59 by consumption 
per capita percentiles. (Panel B) Ratio of women’s to men’s Employment rates and 
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